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Abstract 
In evaluating tax reform in the developing countries, one first needs to determine what 
is the unique role of the tax system in each particular country. One of the key reasons 
for undertaking tax reforms in Kenya was to address issues of inequality and to create a 
sustainable tax system that could generate adequate revenue to finance public 
expenditures. In this respect, the tax modernization programme introduced in the 
country was to achieve a tax system that was sustainable in the face of changing 
conditions domestically and internationally. Policy was shifted towards greater reliance 
on indirect taxes as opposed to direct taxes. Consumption taxes were seen to be more 
favourable to investments and hence growth. Trade taxes, instead of being used for 
protection or revenue-maximization purposes, were viewed more as instruments to 
foster export-led industrialization. Trade taxes were therefore used to create a 
competitive exports sector rather than protect the import-competing manufacturing 
sector, as had been done in the past. 
This study examines the reform efforts of the country, and reviews the strengths and 
weakness of the tax system as it has evolved over the past decades. 
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1 Introduction   
In understanding the tax reform experience in Kenya, one of the questions that must 
be answered is what is the role of the tax system? In practice, there are three common 
objectives of a tax system: (i) to raise revenue to fund government operations; (ii) to 
assist in the redistribution of wealth or income; and (iii) to encourage or discourage 
certain activities through the use of tax provisions. While all tax systems share   
these objectives, what differs is the weight placed in a given country to each of these 
objectives. The capacities of different countries’ tax systems to achieve these 
objectives also differ. In Kenya, raising revenue can be said to have been the 
overriding concern. Moreover, with a limited degree of success, the tax system is also 
used to address issues of inequality as can be deduced from the nominal progressivity 
of the income tax structure. 
Kenya has witnessed significant changes in many aspects of its economy over the last 
four decades. One of the striking characteristics of Kenya is that unlike many other 
Sub-Saharan countries today, it is a high tax-yield country with a tax-to-GDP ratio of 
over 20 per cent. Kenya is able to finance a large share of its budget, while external 
donor finances are used to cover a much smaller share than in other countries of the 
region. This striking feature, however, does not mean that the country is not without 
its problems with the tax system. Like most developing countries, it has had to 
contend and still contends with the common problems that plague tax systems of 
developing countries. These problems are the existence of tax systems (i) with rates 
and structures that are difficult to administer and comply with; (ii) that are 
unresponsiveness both to growth and discretionary tax measures hence offering low 
tax productivity; (iii) that raise little revenue but introduce serious economic 
distortions; (iv) that provide opportunities for differential treatment of individuals and 
businesses in similar circumstances, and (v) that are selective with regard to tax 
administration and enforcement, and skewed in favour of those with the ability to 
defeat the system. 
What criteria should one then use to evaluate Kenya’s tax system in general and its 
specific tax instruments in particular, given the tax reform initiatives to date? Theory 
offers criteria of efficiency, fairness and administrative feasibility both for the specific 
tax instruments and for the entire tax regime. Looking at how far Kenya’s tax system 
goes to meet these criteria and how the weight accorded to each of these goals has 
differed over time given the country’s tax reform process would be a useful way of 
evaluating its progress.  
After this brief introduction, the next step is to explore the history of Kenya’s tax 
reform. The following section of this paper provides a chronological review of the 
main tax reforms in Kenya.  
2  What has been Kenya’s history of tax reform?  
Before the advent of the adjustment programmes that many developing countries 
initiated in the 1980s, most nations in Sub-Saharan Africa had never undertaken 
initiatives that could pass for major tax reforms. Kenya is no exception. The main tax 
reform in Kenya occurred under the tax modernization programme (TMP) that started 
in the late 1980s. This paper focuses on the reforms introduced under the TMP, but  
2 
first we highlight the changes that took place prior to the TMP. Therefore, the 
chronology of the tax reforms is divided into two periods: 1963/4-1983/4 and 
1984/5-2003/4. The paper focuses on the major changes in terms of policy and 
administration during these two periods. A tax-by-tax review is adopted in order to 
demonstrate how these changes have influenced the composition of Kenya’s tax 
revenue today. With this tax-by-tax review, the strengths and weaknesses of the 
evolving tax system can be highlighted and explained. 
2.1  The piecemeal changes: 1963/4 to 1983/4 
The country inherited a tax system with features and characteristics similar in many 
ways to the British tax system of that time. During the period under review, although 
there were no major reform initiatives on the scale seen later under the TMP, there 
were nevertheless certain changes that continued to influence the country’s tax 
system. 
Indirect taxes: from consumption to sales tax 
Until the early 1970s, the country had very few fiscal problems associated with the 
mobilization of tax revenue. The economy was growing at a very high rate, averaging 
over 6 per cent. In the beginning of the 1970s, however, the country started to 
experience its first major fiscal dilemma occasioned by the international energy crisis 
that had very severe consequences for an oil-importing country like Kenya. In an 
attempt to address the fiscal crisis, Kenya replaced the existing consumption taxes 
with a sales tax in the 1972/3 fiscal year. This system was favourable not only for 
targeting specific types of goods to raise additional revenue, but more importantly for 
complementing the inward-looking industrialization policy being pursued at that time. 
Sales tax was also used by the government to set the stage in the early 1980s for the 
policy change of relying more on indirect taxes as a major source of development 
finance in order to increase savings and investment and reduce the reliance on direct 
taxes. 
Trade taxes: the inward-looking policy regime 
Trade taxes in Kenya have been used to achieve two main objectives: to support the 
domestic manufacturing sector through protection from import competition and to 
raise revenue for the government. The weights attached to each of these objectives 
have varied over time. Initially, protection of the domestic manufacturing sector 
carried more weight. As import substitution came under criticism, trade taxes started 
to be used more as an instrument to generate revenue rather than promote 
industrialization. Thus, as early as 1974/5, in the face of the balance-of-payments 
crises that resulted from the first oil shock, there were signs of a policy shift towards 
promoting the exports of manufactured goods in order to reduce the soaring deficit in 
the current account. Import duties on raw materials for some of the domestic 
manufactures were gradually reduced. In addition to the reduction of duty for 
imported raw materials, a subsidy of 10 per cent on the value of exports of 
manufactured goods was introduced at the same time. 
These measures, while being only temporary, were the starting point of a radical shift 
in policy from import substitution to export-led industrialization. But it is clear that 
there was still a degree of protectionism towards domestic manufactures because  
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import duties were increased in 1980/1 by 10 per cent on certain commodities 
competing with domestic goods. These increases, while meeting the government 
objective of protecting domestic industries, were also seen as the starting point 
towards a slightly more significant policy shift. The country changed its policy, 
placing greater reliance on indirect taxes as the major source of development finance 
and a deliberate decision was made to reduce the income taxation burden to promote 
savings and investments. Fiscal year 1983/4 witnessed a more definitive shift towards 
export-led industrialization as duty rates on commodities used for intermediate inputs 
in local industries were reduced in order to grant relief to local export manufacturers. 
This shift was also the initial phase of the more long-term objective of trying to make 
the industry more competitive. Import-substituting industrialization was under-
performing because of an inefficient local manufacturing subsector. With reduced 
duties on intermediate inputs, the domestic sector was expected not only to benefit 
from lower average costs resulting from high import intensity but also to restructure 
as domestic manufacturers of the same imported intermediates faced import 
competition. 
Income taxes: search for a policy position 
Income tax policies in Kenya in the period prior to the major reforms of the TMP are 
indicative of a country in search of a policy position. The country appears to have 
come face-to-face with two dilemmas: the savings (hence growth)-equity dilemma 
and the efficiency-equity dilemma. With regard to the growth-equity dilemma, one 
observes an attempt in the early period to use income tax for redistribution purposes. 
For instance, corporate taxes were high: these were increased in 1973/4 from 40 to 45 
per cent for local companies and from 47.5 to 52 per cent for foreign companies. 
While it can be argued that this increase was a response to the emerging fiscal crisis 
caused by the oil predicament of the time, the prevailing tax rates were quite 
significant. The differential treatment of local and foreign owned companies clearly 
highlights the equity objective that was included in the policy for corporate taxation at 
the time. It was felt that domestic manufacturing industries, unlike the foreign owned 
companies, needed support, i.e. equity. 
The early attempt to use income taxation to address equity objectives is more 
pronounced with personal income taxes. Kenya fell into the same trap as many other 
countries that had hoped to use income taxation for redistributing purposes. Many 
governments—including Kenya—considered personal income taxation (PIT) the most 
convenient and visible instrument to show concern for inequality issues. In this 
respect, Kenya introduced many tax brackets as an indication of the progressivity of 
PIT, and between 1974 and 1986 there were eight tax brackets in effect. Table 1 
shows the country’s PIT system with a very high top marginal tax rate. In 1982, the 
range between the highest and lowest tax brackets was widened, indicating a move 
towards protecting the real incomes of households from inflation. 
The important point to note is that the government hoped to maintain some degree of 
nominal PIT rate progressivity with numerous rate brackets. The government may 
have wanted to appear to be concerned with social justice, and consequently there 
may have been certain reluctance to undertake any PIT reform that would suggest a 
wavering of these commitments. The effectiveness of this nominal-rate progressivity 




PIT progressivity in Kenya 
1974–81   1982-85 
Annual taxable income (Kshs)  Rate (%)    Annual taxable income (Kshs)  Rate (%) 
1–24,000 10    1–30,000 10 
24,001–48,000 15    30,001–60,000 15 
48,001–72,000 25    60,001–90,000 25 
72,001–96,000 35    90,001–120,000 35 
96,001–120,000 45    120,001–150,000 45 
120,001–144,000 50    150,001–180,000 50 
144,001–192,000 60    180,000–240,000 60 
Over 192,000  65    Over 240,000  65 
Source: GoK  (various  years). 
high level of personal exemption (the minimum taxable income, say in multiples of 
per capita income, was as high as four) that still exists today. But it can be argued that 
during this period the government failed to recognize that effective-rate progressivity 
could still have been improved by reducing the degree of nominal-rate progressivity 
and the number of rate brackets. Moreover, the country failed to recognize that the 
effectiveness of the high 65 per cent marginal tax rate was eroded by the fact that it 
applied to high levels of income/GDP ratio so that little income was actually 
subjected to the maximum rate. Furthermore, the maximum level of the personal 
income tax rate was greater than the corresponding corporate income tax (CIT) rate. 
This must have affected taxpayers, as it had the potential of encouraging taxpayers to 
adopt the corporate form of business dealings. In these cases, professionals could 
easily siphon off profits through expense deductions as well as escape the higher PIT 
rate. It would have been good tax policy to have a system in which the top marginal 
PIT rate does not greatly deviate from the CIT rate. 
2.2  Tax reforms: the tax modernization programme, 1984/5 to date 
Excise taxes: shifting between specific and ad valorem tax regimes 
Excise taxes have been an important component of total tax revenue in Kenya. In 
theory, excise taxes have several advantages over other types of taxes, such as 
administrative ease of collection. These taxes also tend to be levied on specific types 
of commodities, and different countries levy them for different reasons. They can be 
applied to compel the users of excised commodities to internalize the externalities that 
excisable commodities such as tobacco, alcohol and petroleum products tend to have. 
Excise taxes may also be used merely to generate revenue. In developed countries, 
excise taxes are sometimes levied to steer the industry concerned towards a desired 
strategic direction. In the case of Kenya, one can discern that excise taxes have been 
levied specifically for meeting the revenue requirements of the government. This 
being the overriding objective, one can then see the weakness that prevailed but which 
the continuously discretionary excise measures failed to recognize. A review of the 
excise tax policy indicates that at the time of implementing the tax modernization 
programme, Kenya maintained a specific excise tax regime. This is evident from the 
discretionary changes that were made in every budget speech from 1984/5 to 1988/9, 
when excise taxes on tobacco and beer were changed annually but the objective was  
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always the same: to ensure that prices were kept in line with domestic inflation and to 
maintain the level of revenue in real terms. In fact, excise taxes on cigarettes and 
tobacco products were raised annually until 1988/9 by an overall weighted average of 
10 per cent. This clearly illustrates the challenge faced by the country in pursuing a 
specific tax regime at a time when the economy was experiencing moderate inflation. 
As long as the country used excise taxes for revenue maximization, maintaining a 
specific tax regime during a period of moderate inflation was going to be a challenge. 
Uncertainty in investment and consumption decisions regarding excised commodities 
was an issue: action was contingent on policy pronouncements of whether rates, 
depending on the inflation outcome, were going up or down. As part of the TMP and 
to support the still valid objective of revenue maximization, there was a change in the 
excise tax regime in 1991/2. A number of excise tax rates were converted from 
specific to ad valorem to help the government achieve its multiple objectives of: 
i)  Ensuring that excise tax revenue increased in parallel with inflation, thus 
eliminating the need for discretionary measures. This automatic inflation 
adjustment was intended to offset the anticipated revenue loss from reduced 
import duty rates; 
ii)  Allowing for the rationalization of VAT rates and increasing control over high 
tax rate goods; and 
iii)  Giving equal tax treatment to all types of beer and closing the gap between 
malt and non-malt beer. 
The regime switch to ad valorem excise taxes in 1991/2 did not eliminate discretion 
as had been expected. During the following year, for instance, in order to take 
advantage of increased beer consumption, rates for alcoholic products were raised for 
revenue generation purposes. Another issue with Kenya’s excise tax policy was the 
persistent continuation of multiple tax rates. But there were moves to rationalize the 
number of rates. In 1993/4 excise duty on cigarettes, which had been linked to three 
different price-based brackets, was changed to two length-based bands; furthermore, 
this amendment also improved the ease of administration. In 1997/8, excise duty on 
cigarettes was rationalized to a uniform 135 per cent rate in order to simplify the 
collection of domestic excises and prevent mis-declaration of imported cigarettes. 
Similar measures were implemented for alcoholic products but multiple rates 
continued to be applied for malt, non-malt and other locally made alcoholic products. 
In 2003/4, the country abandoned the ad valorem regime and reverted back to specific 
taxation for tobacco and alcoholic products. However, it is important to mention that 
the country’s excise tax policy has recently been influenced by the regional 
integration initiatives that Kenya is party to. Harmonization of policies has been one 
of the key issues in the treaty of the East African Community (EAC), comprising 
Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. Thus, in 1999/2000, the excise tax measures reducing 
the ad valorem rates for malt beers from 95 to 90 per cent were prompted by the 
country’s desire to bridge the taxation gap with its neighbours. Duties on beer and 
cigarettes were further reduced in 2000/1 with the key objective of continuing with 
the rationalization of duty rates within the EAC. It was hoped that the rationalization 
would strengthen control over the smuggled or untaxed commodities on the market. It 
is noteworthy that while excise taxes for cigarettes and alcohol were converted from  
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specific to ad valorem, petroleum products continued to remain within the specific tax 
regime. After the introduction of excise tax for petroleum products, the value of this 
particular tax group had fallen 12 per cent by 2001, an indication of the effect of 
inflation. 
When the ad valorem regime was abandoned in favour of the specific regime for 
cigarettes and beer in fiscal year 2002/3, a hybrid excise duty of a minimum specific 
tax and an additional ad valorem rate were introduced on both domestic and imported 
cigarettes. The key objective was to deal with the tobacco industry’s increased 
smuggling, tax evasion and under-declaration of taxable values. By 2003/4, excise 
taxation of cigarettes and beer had been reverted back to a specific regime based on 
four bands, equivalent to an effective rate of 110 per cent. A specific excise regime 
was introduced on beer with three bands in an effort to reduce tax evasion, to simplify 
and improve the effective tax rate and the subsequent revenue yield while 
encouraging investment in quality cigarette and beer products for export. There is 
empirical evidence that specific excise tax regimes in low-inflation countries are more 
favourable to investments in high quality products than ad valorem regimes. 
Customs duties: towards export-led industrialization 
The contribution from customs duties to the country’s total revenue is mainly driven 
by the trade policy Kenya has pursued since 1984/5. There have been changes in the 
number of tariffs and in the rates ever since the country started implementing 
structural adjustment policies. The objectives underpinning tariff changes have been 
attempts towards greater openness, but there have also been episodes of protectionism 
for specific sectors or subsectors of the economy. These are summarized below. We 
also examine how this has influenced tariff rates, their structure and ultimately the 
contribution of customs duty to total tax revenue. It is clear, however, that unlike 
many developing countries, Kenya has not relied to any great extent on import duties 
for revenue mobilization. 
Economic restructuring 
The country adopted a trade policy in 1984/5 that clearly refrained from protectionism 
as its overriding objective. There were distinct efforts at introducing restructuring 
incentives and reducing the cost of production. During this period, most duties 
exceeding 25 per cent were cut for the express purpose of restructuring the economy 
towards export production, and away from the highly protected and inefficient pattern 
of industrialization that had been based on import substitution. Zero rating for 
agricultural inputs was also introduced during this period to improve production. 
Import tariffs on raw materials, intermediate inputs for industry and capital goods 
were decreased in the efforts to restructure. 
Enhancing efficiency 
The economy had suffered significantly from an inefficient production system that 
had resulted from the country’s protectionist trade policy. During trade liberalization, 
tariff rates were reduced in favour of intermediate and capital goods in order to trim 
prevailing economic distortions and to encourage local production. Duties on 
agricultural inputs continued to be removed in hopes that the country could boost 
agricultural productivity.  
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Simplifying and rationalizing the tariffs 
As Kenya continued to pursue a trade policy geared to boosting industrialization and 
expanding domestic manufacturing, it was realized that the tariff structure was too 
complex. Subsequently, trade policy focussed on tariff rationalization with the aim of 
achieving a four-rate system (including duty free) that would simplify import duty 
administration. In 1988/9, the country reduced the number of tariff categories from 25 
to 17. Another five tariff categories were abolished the following year, bringing the 
total number of tariff bands to 12. This last rationalization lowered import duty rates 
on raw materials and intermediate goods by an average of 5 per cent. At the same 
time, however, duties on some of the refined and finished goods were increased; 
clearly indicating that trade policy had not been completely forgotten as an instrument 
of protectionism. 
Export competitiveness 
As the country continued to restructure the economy, there were deliberate efforts to 
address the issue of export competitiveness by lowering production costs through 
smaller average tariffs and by narrowing their dispersion. In 1990/1, the top duty rate 
of 135 per cent was cut to 100 per cent. Duties on imported raw materials, 
intermediate goods and spare parts were reduced further to improve the 
competitiveness of local goods in export markets. Further adjustments were 
undertaken: over the three-year period 1991/2 to 1994/5 the number of tariff bands 
was successfully reduced from 15 to 11 with a ceiling rate of 70 per cent, to nine tariff 
bands with a 60 per cent maximum rate, and finally in 1993/4 to only seven bands, 
underscoring the government’s commitment to the policy of import liberalization as 
part of the structural adjustment programme that advocated trade liberalization in 
order to make exports more rewarding. 
Agricultural sector protection 
While there was a clear policy of zero-rated inputs for the agricultural sector, by 
1995/6 there was again a deliberate move towards protectionism with either a specific 
or ad valorem import duty for agricultural products. In 1996/7, several ad valorem 
rates were proposed on major products. Falling world prices were cited as justification 
for the need to introduce the suspended 70 per cent duty on agricultural imports to 
protect the Kenyan producers faced with continual stiff competition. 
The re-entry of industrial protection 
The trade liberalization policy that had been aggressively pursued since the mid 1980s 
started facing serious issues of credibility in some of the sectors of the economy. It 
was argued that there had been blind liberalization, which hurt some of the domestic 
producers of import-competing goods, and by 1999/2000 a policy shift towards the 
protection of some sectors started to creep in. In addition to increasing rates on 
agricultural commodity imports, the suspended duty on commercial vehicles and 
textiles was reversed to strengthen domestic businesses. This clearly resembled the 
industrialization policy of import substitution that had been discredited earlier for 




2.3  Consumption taxes: from a sales tax to the value added tax (VAT) 
It is obvious that Kenya had definitive intentions with regard to trade taxes, and the 
main focus was more on facilitating the economic restructure towards a competitive 
export sector rather than revenue mobilization. A review of the trade taxes objectives, 
however, also shows that there is still active protection of the agricultural sector and a 
shift to using tariffs to protect the manufacturing sector has recently been observed. 
With respect to indirect taxation, for most of the period 1984/5 to 2002/3, revenue 
mobilization was the overriding aim of excise taxation. However, the excise taxation 
regime was recently changed to help the manufacturing industry become export 
oriented by means of policy that is supportive of investments in high quality excisable 
commodities. But the goal of revenue maximization continues to be important, as can 
be discerned from the fact that the specific excise tax was set at ad valorem rates to 
match levels considered to be empirically optimal. This was particularly true for 
cigarettes (see Kiringai, Ndung’u and Karingi 2002) while in the case of beer, 
effective ad valorem taxes were reduced to a level judged to be optimal (see Karingi, 
Kimenyi and Ndung’u 2001). Nevertheless, the recent tax rate reductions have also 
reflected to some extent the need for tax harmonization within the EAC since excise 
taxes tend to be lower in Uganda and Tanzania than in Kenya. 
The other major indirect taxes are consumption taxes. Kenya had a sales tax in place 
that was replaced by VAT in the 1989/90 fiscal year. Before examining the country’s 
experience with VAT, it is worth mentioning that measures had been taken under the 
TMP to make sales tax easier to administer and to comply with. For instance, in 
1984/5, the number of tax rates was reduced to five to simplify tax administration for 
better revenue generation. However, discretionary changes to the different sales tax 
rates for specific commodities continued: certain rates were increased (on 
commodities considered luxury items) in order to offset the revenue loss resulting 
from reduced taxes on basic goods. At other times, sales tax was used to stimulate 
local production by reducing rates on domestic goods to promote increased demand. 
Furthermore, Kenya’s discretionary tax policy enabled sales tax to be used as an 
instrument for maximizing revenue during temporary economic shocks. For instance, 
sales tax on oil products was increased in 1986/7 and concessions on oil products 
revoked to maximize the windfall gains from low oil prices.  
Sales tax, unlike VAT, allowed specific income-related policies to be addressed 
through a framework of differentiated rates. For example, in 1987/8, sales tax rates on 
passenger cars were lowered so that motor vehicles would become affordable to 
middle-income Kenyans.  
The introduction of VAT 
VAT replaced the sales tax as of 1st January 1990, and the input credit system was 
adopted in Kenya at its introduction. The standard VAT rate was set at 17 per cent to 
cover not only manufactured goods but all goods and services as well. The initial 
phases of VAT were complex, as there were 15 different rates, the highest being 210 
per cent. Several changes have since occurred (see Table 2). Within a year of its 
introduction, the number of rates was reduced to eight and the maximum rate reduced 
to 100 per cent. The standard VAT rate was implemented on both inputs and outputs. 




Rationalization process for VAT rates in Kenya  
Year  No. of rates  Rates (%)  Standard rate (%) 
1989/90 15      17 
1990/1  9  0, 5, 18, 30, 45, 50, 80, 100, 150  18 
1991/2  8  0, 5, 18, 25, 35, 50, 75, 100  18 
1992/3  6  0, 3, 5, 18, 30 and 50  18 
1993/4  4  0, 5, 18 and 40  18 
1994/5  4  0, 5, 18 and 30  18 
1995/6  4  0, 6, 15 and 25  15 
1996/7  3  0, 8, and 15  15 
1997/8  3  0, 10, and 17  17 
1998/9  4  0, 10, 12 and 16  16 
1999/00  4  0, 10, 13 and 15  15 
2000/1  4  0, 10, 16 and 18  18 
2001/2  4  0, 10, 16 and 18  18 
2002/3  4  0, 10, 16 and 18  18 
2003/4  3  0, 10, and 16  16 
Source: GoK  (various  years). 
minimizing tax evasion and making local products more competitive. Further 
rationalizations in VAT rates were to follow, although this process took some time; 
for instance, in 1992/3 there were still six rates, with a 75 per cent ceiling, but only 
four in 1993/4. Rationalization was considered necessary in order to eliminate 
misclassification, simplify tax administration, improve compliance, control smuggling 
and minimize exemption requests. There were continual cuts to the top rate so that by 
1994/5 when there were four VAT levels, the highest rate was reduced from 40 to 30 
per cent and the standard rate maintained at 18 per cent. 
In order to encourage voluntary compliance the standard rate was reduced in 1995/6 
to 15 per cent and the highest rate cut to 25 per cent. By now, the structure of VAT 
was moving towards a single rate, which was to simplify its administration 
significantly. Thus, the year 1996/7 saw the top rate of 25 per cent being slashed to 
the standard rate while the lower rate was increased from 6 to 8 per cent and further to 
10 per cent in the following year.  
A distinct feature of VAT in Kenya is that it has been the choice instrument for 
dealing with exceptional circumstances, and unexpected expenditures have been 
financed with increased VAT rates. The tax has also been used as part of the industrial 
strategy. In order to revamp Kenyan industries, stimulate economic activities and to 
encourage local production within specific sectors, a zero-rated VAT was applied to 
the relevant subsectors. Surprisingly, it was not until 2003/4 that VAT was recognized 
as an important instrument that could be used to boost consumption demand in the 
country. 
The TMP has introduced major changes in income taxes in Kenya, particularly with 
regard to personal income taxes, as we will see later. 
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2.4  Corporate income taxes (CIT): the competition for foreign investments 
in a globalized world 
The most important reforms in CIT have focused mainly on lowering rates in efforts 
to combat stiff global competition for investment funds. Rates have been decreased 
from the 45 per cent peak in 1989/90 to 30 per cent today. These measures have 
enabled the country to respond not only to competition from other countries for 
investment finance but also to present itself as a feasible destination for investment. 
There are three important issues worth highlighting with regard to the corporate 
income tax system in Kenya. 
Equalizing the CIT rate to match the top marginal PIT rate  
When tax reforms were initiated in Kenya, the top marginal PIT rates were generally 
higher than the CIT rates. This encouraged individuals to turn to business taxation and 
in the process to claim deductions that reduced their tax liability even further at the 
lower CIT rates. To eliminate this anomaly, the top marginal PIT rate and the CIT rate 
were equated. 
Differentiated CIT rates for foreign owned and domestic companies 
CIT rates for foreign incorporated companies have generally been higher than for 
resident companies. The differentiated rates were continued even after the tax reform 
period, and were used to encourage local registration and incorporation of companies.  
Tax incentives via the CIT system as export-led industrialization strategy 
As was discussed earlier in connection with trade and excise taxes, Kenya has re-
oriented its development strategy towards export-led industrialization. In this respect, 
fiscal policy, particularly taxation, has been a critical instrument in realizing this goal. 
Subsequent trade policies have been targeted towards making Kenya’s exports 
competitive; import duties have been zero-rated and raw materials tax-exempted. On 
the other hand, the present excise tax regime is geared to promoting investment in 
high quality commodities so that the country becomes competitive in the export 
market for these products. The tax system in terms of the CIT has been reformed 
towards using tax incentives to encourage investments in Kenya. Tax holidays, 
repatriation of dividends and extending favourable investment deduction allowances 
have been critical lynchpins of the income tax system for companies wishing to invest 
in Kenya. 
2.5 Personal income tax: trading progressivity for efficiency—the quest 
for growth over equity 
Before the tax reforms, nominal progressivity and high marginal tax rates were 
common, but tax rationalization introduced a reduction in the number of tax brackets 
and a 50 per cent cut in the top marginal rates. Most of the criticism that was directed 
at personal income taxation in the pre-reform period has been addressed, particularly 
with regard to nominal progressivity as compared to effective progressivity. In 
addition, the top marginal tax rates—affecting only a small proportion of the 
taxpaying population in a country like Kenya—have also been reduced and matched 
to the CIT rate. In this section, we review the issues and improvements that have 
taken place under the personal income tax regime.  
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Regular adjustments to counter the inflation creep 
One clear observation is that the personal income rates have been adjusted almost 
annually to keep pace with inflation and to provide inflation relief (Table 3).  
Reducing the top marginal tax rates 
As noted earlier, Kenya attempted to use the PIT structure for redistribution purposes. 
This has been common practice in many countries, both developed and developing, 
but as the competition for foreign direct investments increased and the level of foreign 
aid dwindled, it became necessary for countries to mobilize savings at the domestic 
level. High personal income taxes, especially the top marginal rates, have a negative 
effect on savings. Households that would otherwise postpone consumption in favour 
of savings reconsider when PIT rates are high. By lowering the top marginal tax rate, 
the PIT system can be used to remove the disincentive to save. As Table 3 clearly 
shows, Kenya gradually decreased its top marginal tax rate from 65 per cent to the 
current 30 per cent to provide personal incentive to save and to stimulate enterprises 
by creating a savings pool. This, it was hoped, would improve the performance of the 
economy and enhance job creation. 
Reducing the number of tax brackets  
Kenya’s tax modernization programme perceived personal income tax to be an 
essential instrument in achieving not only equity objectives but also economic growth. 
The reduction in the number of tax brackets helped to eliminate the nominal 
progressivity of the tax system that had limited its effectiveness, and at the same time 
simplified the many tax brackets that had created the complex system.  
Regular increases and unifying family relief 
Income tax deductions are in practice major instruments used by governments all over 
the world to achieve redistribution objectives. Such deductions tend to be means-
tested with the income level as the main determinant of relief. In Kenya, the income 
tax system has been set up so that tax relief is provided to every registered income 
taxpayer irrespective of their income level. Thus, tax relief cannot be said to play any 
significant role in terms of income redistribution. However, it has been a useful 
instrument in providing income tax exemptions for low-income earners. Although 
relief over time has been increased to its current annual level of Kshs 12,672, the most 
significant reform has been the unification of the single tax and the married (family) 
relief into one. The differentiated relief level based to one’s marital status was 
discriminatory. In addition, relief was available only to males who claimed to be 
married but not to women. This showed gender insensitivity in addition to gender-
based discrimination. But the most significant negative effect of the differentiated 
relief was probably the impact it had on the decision of taxpayers with respect to 
marriage. 
Differential taxation of dividend and interest income 
Kenya’s personal income tax is derived almost entirely from the salaries and wages of 
formal sector employees. There is some limited contribution from other individual 
income taxes. However, a substantial proportion of Kenyan households derive part of 
their income from interest earnings and from dividends. During the reform period, 
there were various adjustments to the treatment of the two types of income. They are,  
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however, still treated separately and attracted different rates for most of the period 
under review. This contributes to an inefficient allocation of investments, favouring 
assets with the lowest withholding tax and whether the tax is final or not. In theory, 
taxation of interest income is argued to be a disincentive to attracting foreign capital 
as well as encouraging capital flight. This argument is apt for Kenya as it has an open 
capital account which makes it easy to invest locally derived savings in foreign capital 
markets such as the United States where the tax rate on interest income is zero. 
Table 3 
PIT brackets in Kenya, 1986-2003 
Year  Annual taxable income (Kshs) Rate (%)    Year  Annual taxable income (Kshs)  Rate (%)
1986-87 1–36,000  10    1988-89 1–39,600  10 
 36,001–72,000  15     39,601–79,200  15 
 72,001–180,000  25     79,201–118,800  25 
 108,001–144,000  35     118,801–158,400  35 
 144,001–180,000  45     158,401–198,000  45 
 180,001–216,000  50      Over  198,000  65 
 216,001–252,000  60         
 Over  252,000  65         
1990-91 1–42,000  10    1992  1–46,000  10 
 42,001–84,000  15     46,001–92,000  15 
 84,001–126,000  25     92,001–138,000  25 
 126,001–168,000  35     138,001–184,000  35 
 Over  168,000  45     Over  184,000  45 
1993 1–52,800  10    1994 1–60,000  10 
 52,801–105,600  15     60,001–120,000  15 
 105,601–158,400  20     120,001–180,000  20 
 158,401–211,200  25     180,001–240,000  25 
 211,201–264,000  35     240,001–300,000  35 
 Over  264,000  40     Over  300,000  40 
1995 1–78,000  10    1996 1–78,000  10 
 78,001–156,000  15     78,001–156,000  15 
 156,001–234,000  20     156,001–234,000  20 
 234,001–312,000  25     234,001–312,000  25 
 312,001–390,000  35      Over  312,000  35 
 Over  390,000  37.5         
1997 1–82,080  10    1998  1  90,240  10 
 82,081–164,160  15     90,241  -180,480  15 
 164,161–246,240  20     180,481–270,720  20 
 246,241–328,320  25     270,721–360,960  25 
 328,321–410,400  30     360,961–451,200  30 
 Over  410,400  35     Over  451,200  32.5 
1999 1–94,800  10    2000  1–104,400  10 
 94,801–189,600  15      104,401–208,800  15 
 189,601–284,400  20     208,801–313,200  20 
 284,401–379,200  25     313,201–417,600  25 
 379,201–474,000  30      Over  417,600  30 
 Over  474,000  32.5         
2001 1–109,440  10    2002-03 1–116,160  10 
 109,441–218,880  15     116,161–225,600  15 
 218,881–328,320  20     225,601–335,040  20 
 328,321–437,760  25     335,041–444,480  25 
 Over  437,760  30     Over  444,480  30 
Source: GoK  (various  years).  
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Challenges in taxing agriculture and the informal sector—the presumptive income tax 
Like many other developing countries, Kenya faces challenges in taxing income 
derived from agriculture and the informal sector. The tax policy has attempted at 
different times to introduce a presumptive income tax for agriculture, but this has 
been vexing and has been introduced and abolished in cycles. This means that a good 
part of agricultural income is untaxed. The same applies to the informal sector. 
Attempts to introduce a workable presumptive tax system for the informal section 
failed even during the reform era. 
3  The structure of Kenya’s tax system: pre- and post reform 
One of the key reasons for undertaking tax reforms in Kenya was to create a 
sustainable tax system that could generate adequate revenue to finance public 
expenditures. In this respect, the tax modernization programme endeavoured to 
achieve a tax system that was sustainable in the face of changing conditions 
domestically and internationally. Policy was shifted towards greater reliance on 
indirect taxes as opposed to direct taxes. Consumption taxes were seen to be more 
favourable to investments and hence growth. Trade taxes, instead of being used for 
protection or revenue-maximization purposes, were viewed more as instruments to 
foster export-led industrialization. Trade taxes were therefore used to create a 
competitive exports sector rather than protect the import-competing manufacturing 
sector. In this section, we address the question of how the structure of Kenya’s tax 
system has changed in post-reform period. To answer this question, we evaluate the 
effect of tax reforms on tax revenue and its composition in the pre- and post 
adjustment period, as measured by the tax/GDP ratios and the share of specific taxes 
in total tax revenue. In analysing the resultant tax structure, reference is made to the 
reforms already discussed, with a view of mapping the outcome to the actual reform 
initiatives and objectives. 
3.1  Aggregate level of taxes in Kenya 
What factors should be considered in determining the aggregate level of taxes? 
Economic theory provides little guidance on optimal aggregate tax levels at given 
levels of economic development. The focus therefore tends to be on the structure of a 
tax system with regard to a particular tax revenue requirement. However, it is not 
possible to separate the question of the appropriate aggregate level of taxes from the 
appropriate level of government expenditures. Kenya has moved from being a low 
tax-yield country to a high tax yield. Forty years ago, total tax revenue to GDP 
averaged 10.6 per cent (see Table 4). This tax yield rose successfully even before the 
major tax reform programme to peak on average at 19.7 per cent of GDP by the early 
1980s. But this level of tax yield compared to the expenditure-to-GDP ratio was 
nonetheless insufficient. Consequently, one of the main objectives of the TMP was to 
raise tax yield on a zero deficit strategy to match expenditures which were on average 
28 per cent of GDP. This objective was never achieved and the best performance in 
terms of tax yield was during the years 1993/4-97/8, when it climbed to 24.4 per cent 
of GDP. But how does Kenya compare internationally? The often-cited study by 
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Total  revenue  10.6 13.6 16.9 19.7   19.3 21.4 24.4 22.8 
Import  duty  4.2 4.2 4.0 4.8   3.9 3.2 4.1 3.8 
Excise  duty  1.8 2.3 1.9 2.1   1.7 2.4 4.1 3.8 
Income  tax  4.1 6.1 6.6 6.5   6.3 7.3 9.3 7.4 
Sales tax/VAT
1  0.0 0.4 4.1 5.6   6.2 7.4 5.9 5.7 
Others  0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6   1.1 1.0 0.9 2.0 
Note: 
1  Sales tax was introduced during fiscal year 1971/2 and replaced by VAT in 1989/90. 
Source:   Authors’  computations. 
of GDP in developed countries and 19.6 per cent in Africa. Kenya at this time had an 
aggregate tax revenue of 19.3 per cent of GDP, indicating a tax yield consistent with 
Africa’s average. In the same study, the aggregate tax revenue for the period 1995-97 
for developed countries was about 38 per cent of GDP. In contrast, for the same time 
period the average level of tax revenue for developing countries was only about 18 
per cent and 19.8 per cent for Africa. Kenya at this time had managed to improve its 
tax-yield ratio to about 24 per cent of GDP. Thus, while other African countries’ 
aggregate revenue stagnated, Kenya has been able to raise its ratio by more than five 
percentage points. During the tax reform process, the country’s fiscal strategy was 
revised and the revenue target is currently 22 per cent of GDP. In terms of revenue 
adequacy, the TMP can be said to have been successful, as there was a clear 
improvement in tax yield before the revision of the fiscal strategy.  
The relative use of different tax instruments in Kenya 
Optimal tax theories provide some guidance on the choice and design of tax 
instruments in a given tax system. The theory of optimal taxation attempts to achieve 
Pareto optimality by achieving Pareto efficiency in the design of a tax structure. In 
practice however, because of the restrictive assumptions of optimal tax theory, there is 
a gap between optimal theory and practical guidance in designing tax systems. Given 
these restrictive assumptions, this study does not attempt to evaluate Kenya’s tax 
system before and after reforms or its use of different instruments on the basis of 
optimal taxation issues. Instead, it examines the relative use of different tax 
instruments regardless of whether or not they are optimal.  
Table 5 provides a clear picture of how Kenya’s tax structure has changed over time. 
In addition to seeking to raise the tax yield of the economy to a level that would allow 
the country to pursue a sustainable deficit policy, the TMP sought to address the 
constraints in the existing tax structure that could have deterred achieving this goal. 
These included the reliance on direct taxes in spite of the negative effects such taxes 
have on the sustainability of economic growth. Another constraint was the 
significance of trade taxes in total tax revenue despite emerging evidence that import 
substitution is less than successful as an industrialization policy and hence there was 




Tax structure in Kenya as a percentage of total tax revenue 
 
Pre-tax modernization programme 
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Total  revenue  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0   100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 
Import  duty  39.8 31.5 23.2 24.6    20.3 15.7 16.7 16.9 
Excise  duty  17.0 17.2 11.0 10.7    9.0 10.5 16.9 16.6 
Income  tax  38.3 44.6 38.8 33.2    32.7 32.6 38.3 32.3 
Sales tax/VAT1  0.0  2.9 24.2 28.3    32.2 36.1 24.3 25.2 
Others  5.0 3.8 2.8 3.2    5.8 5.0 3.8 9.0 
Note:  1  Sales tax was introduced during 1971/2 fiscal year and replaced by VAT in 1989/90. 
Source:   Authors’  computations. 
this objective was the reality that free trade and globalization were becoming more 
and more entrenched in the global economic arena, and countries would have to 
choose whether to open up or remain closed to the rest of the world. 
A look at Table 5 indicates that there have been no major changes in the number and 
type of tax instruments in Kenya’s tax system before or after reforms, with the 
exception of VAT which replaced sales tax. Other tax instruments, such as personal 
income taxes, corporate income tax, excise tax, and trade taxes, have been retained.  
How relevant and practical is Kenya’s relative use of the various tax instruments? 
Should the country have different tax instruments? Theoretically, there are several 
advantages to using various different types of taxes. First, the use of multiple taxes 
provides insulation against economic or cyclical changes. Changing economic 
conditions may affect a particular taxbase but are very unlikely to affect all taxbases 
at the same time. This has been very useful for Kenya even when looking at the 
aggregate level of tax revenue. Second, multiple taxes allow lower rates on any one 
taxbase. This reduces the distorting effect of a tax, especially in view of the fact that 
distortion increases substantially as tax rates go up. Third, it may be politically more 
feasible to have a larger group of taxes with low rates than a few taxes with high rates. 
Finally, multiple taxbases may reduce evasion or avoidance because taxpayers are 
unlikely to be able to sidestep all taxes.  
In spite of these benefits, there are several disadvantages to using multiple taxation. 
First, multiple taxes may mean higher administration costs for both taxpayers and 
taxing authorities. The administrative costs of adopting new taxes are likely to be 
much higher than the increase in administrative costs resulting from measures to 
extract more revenue from existing taxes. Second, depending on the taxes used and 
their design, the cumulative distorting effect of multiple taxation may be greater than 
with fewer tax instruments. This may be especially true when different taxes apply to 
the same transaction. Third, the use of multiple taxes makes it harder to determine the 
distribution of an individual’s burden from the different taxes or determining the 
incidence of multiple taxes on an individual or group of individuals.  
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4  The outcome of Kenya’s tax reforms 
It is clear that the multiple tax instruments Kenya has adopted in its tax system have 
both advantages and disadvantages. As noted above, the number of tax instruments 
has not changed in any major way following reforms but based on the evidence in 
Tables 4 and 5, certain specific results can be distilled from Kenya’s tax reform 
efforts. 
4.1  Diminishing role of trade taxes 
The significance of trade taxes in Kenya’s total tax revenue has diminished 
considerably. In the early 1960s, trade taxes constituted 40 per cent of total tax 
revenue or 4.2 per cent of GDP. This ratio continued to fall and was around 25 per 
cent of total revenue before the modernization programme, TMP. The TMP led to a 
further drop in the ratio of trade taxes to roughly 17 per cent of total tax revenue. 
Tanzi and Zee (2000) note that trade taxes are a relatively insignificant source of 
revenue for developed countries (less than 0.3 per cent of GDP) but that they 
constitute between 20-40 per cent of total tax revenue for developing countries. These 
authors also note that in general, the percentage of trade taxes in total tax revenue for 
developing countries is higher in low tax-yield countries (where tax revenue as a 
percentage of GDP ranges between 5-10 per cent) than in medium tax-yield (10-20 
per cent of GDP) or high tax-yield countries (greater than 20 per cent of GDP). As 
Kenya developed from a low to a high tax-yield country, also trade taxes became less 
important. But probably what could be hidden in this inverse relationship is that trade 
taxes in terms of a proportion of GDP still constitute roughly 4 per cent.1 Another 
possible explanation is that Kenya has adjusted its trade policy paradigm with regard 
to export competitiveness to embrace free trade and the challenges of globalization as 
opposed to relying on the protection of import competing sectors.  
4.2  The importance of excise taxes 
Initially, excise taxes were important, as they constituted 17 per cent of total revenue, 
but declined to only 11 per cent by fiscal year 1982/3 (see Table 5). During this 
period, Kenya’s economy experienced a moderate level of inflation, but a specific 
excise tax regime prevailed at the same time. One of the measures implemented under 
the TMP was the switch from an excise tax regime to ad valorem at least in the case 
of tobacco and alcohol products. This seems to have been quite successful as the 
excise tax contribution improved from 9-10 per cent to about 17 per cent of total tax 
revenue. But augmented by theoretical and empirical evidence that specific taxes are 
more favourable in terms of investments in high quality products for competitive 
export markets, the country reverted back to a specific tax regime. An important 
observation related to excise taxes is that their automatic up-rating may be necessary 
unless inflation can be contained at a very low level. 
                                                 
1  The constancy of the trade taxes-to-GDP ratio at roughly 4 per cent could be misleading given that 
Kenya’s economic growth has been declining and has exhibited over the last decade an average 
growth path of 2 per cent per annum (see Njuguna, Karingi and Kimenyi 2003).  
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4.3  Reduced role for income taxes but still the most significant group 
One of the objectives of tax reform was to reduce Kenya’s reliance on direct taxes, 
and subsequently there were measures to support greater reliance on indirect taxes, 
specifically consumption taxes. Theoretical justification for using consumption rather 
than income taxes to raise government revenue is evident in the pro-growth 
environment. To fully understand the outcome of the tax reforms, it is necessary to 
consider these with regard to their international context. The Tanzi and Zee study 
(2000) indicates that reliance on consumption taxes rather than income taxes is much 
greater in developing countries than in the developed, where income tax revenue 
generally exceeds revenue from consumption taxes by a substantial margin (14.2 per 
cent of GDP for income taxes compared to 11.4 per cent of GDP for consumption 
taxes). In contrast, developing countries receive twice as much tax receipts from 
consumption taxes (10.5 per cent of GDP as compared to 5.2 per cent of GDP on the 
part of income taxes). Kenya is no exception, as can be seen from Table 3. Prior to 
reform, income taxes averaged 6 per cent of GDP and consumption taxes (excise plus 
sales tax) stood at 7.7 per cent of GDP. After tax reforms, consumption taxes have 
become more significant, constituting approximately 10 per cent of GDP while 
income taxes account for slightly over 7 per cent. Thus, some success was achieved 
by the shift to consumption taxes, if not in comparison to the ratios of the developed 
countries but at least versus the developing countries. 
Another important point should be highlighted with respect to income taxes: the 
relative proportion of revenue accruing from individual or corporate taxes differs 
between developed and developing countries. In the developed countries, individual 
income taxes exceed corporate income taxes by 3 to 1. In contrast, in the developing 
countries, revenue from corporate taxation exceeds individual income taxes by a 
substantial margin. In Kenya, however, both individual and corporate income taxes 
had contributed almost equal shares but individual income taxes have recently 
overtaken corporate income taxes. This may be one explanation why Kenya continues 
to perform better than other African countries in terms of tax yield. 
VAT productivity: a continual challenge 
Since VAT was adopted by the countries of the European Union, it has gained 
popularity globally and has become one of the components of major tax reform 
initiatives in many countries. Indeed, in Kenya, VAT was perceived as the tax of the 
future in line with the country’s objective of reducing reliance on direct taxes as well 
as diminishing the role of trade taxes. In this respect, the performance of VAT 
becomes an important issue for study. 
Figure 1 shows the productivity2 of VAT since its introduction. As is clear from the 
figure, productivity improved slightly for the first few years before peaking at around 
44 per cent in 1993/4 fiscal year. Then there was a drastic fall to about 31 per cent in 
1994/5 before recovery to around 38 per cent in the following year, but this recovery 
could not be sustained. There have been some years of falling productivity and even 
though the decline has been reversed, productivity has not returned to the levels of its 
                                                 
2  VAT productivity is derived by dividing the ratio of VAT to GDP with VAT’s standard rate.  
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initial phase. Low productivity does seem to indicate the possibility of structural 
problems that the tax reforms may have failed to address.   
Figure 1 




































Source:  Authors’ computations. 
Evidence of distributional impact: have the reforms been pro-poor? 
Having an equitable tax system was one of the objectives of Kenya’s tax 
modernization programme. Therefore, an important question in assessing the 
outcomes of the tax reform is, how effective have the different tax instruments been in 
redistributing wealth or income in the country? In both theory and practice, tax 
instruments vary greatly in their ability to redistribute wealth or income. Individual 
income taxes and wealth taxes are the primary instruments to achieve redistribution. 
Whether and to what degree corporate income taxes support the redistribution of 
wealth depends on whether shareholders—as opposed to labour or consumers—bear 
the corporate tax burden. Taxes on consumption are generally assumed to be 
regressive, given that lower-income groups tend to spend a higher percentage of their 
income than the more affluent income groups. But the regressivity of consumption 
taxes is not as severe when considered over a lifetime perspective as espoused in 
theories covering intergenerational equity issues. Whether taxes in Kenya, particularly 
during and after reforms, have aided in the redistribution of income or in providing 
targeted relief is a difficult question. This issue notwithstanding, unless personal 
income taxes play a greater role in the country, redistribution through taxation will be 
very difficult. Moreover, income tax competition from other countries and the 
limitations of tax administration restrict the possibilities of using the tax system to 
redistribute income and wealth.  
Addressing poverty concerns through the design of specific tax instruments looks 
sometimes promising but this has not been a key feature of Kenya’s taxation. Tax 
instruments differ in their effectiveness in reducing the tax burden of the poor. 
Countries use their individual income tax systems to address poverty issues in one of  
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three ways: (i) use the system as part of the social welfare programme to provide cash 
transfers to low-income individuals; (ii) adopt a high taxable threshold to exempt 
certain low-income individuals from income tax; and (iii) adopt provisions that seek 
to reduce the tax burden of low-income individuals. Of these three measures, the first 
option has not been a part of Kenya’s tax reforms. Nor has the third option been 
utilized for income redistribution purposes; if anything, the provisions already in 
place in Kenya such as tax deductibility of individual pension schemes, life insurance 
premium payments, mortgage interest costs and education policies are more beneficial 
to the middle- to high-income groups. The equity issue and support for the poor have 
mainly been addressed through the second option in conjunction with an expansion of 
the income tax brackets. The income tax threshold,
3 currently four times Kenya’s per 
capita income, has been increased gradually over the reform period. From Table 6 one 
can see that there have been efforts at protecting the poor via personal income 
taxation, as the PIT threshold over the tax reform period has been consistently raised 
in comparison to per capita income. Although Table 6 does not tell us much about the 
progressivity
4 of income tax, it is obvious that it takes the lower-income groups longer 
today to reach a positive net PIT paying position than it did, for instance, in 1995. 
The other equity-related taxation question concerns VAT. A single rate VAT may be 
regressive in comparison to income, because low-income groups spend a higher 
percentage of their income than high-income individuals. As part of its tax reforms, 
Kenya, like many other countries, sought to offset the regressivity of VAT by 
reducing the tax burden on the basic goods and services believed to constitute a higher 
proportion of total spending of the poor as compared to more affluent groups. 
However, it is possible that different income groups purchase many of the same goods 
and services. It is also possible that high-income groups are buying more expensive 
products compared to the less well-off. If this is the case, lower VAT rates on basic 
goods may be ineffective in achieving distributional goals, and it may be necessary to 
address redistribution concerns with measures outside the VAT system. Using 
multiple VAT rates, which were a part of Kenya’s tax reforms initially, imposed 
significant administrative costs because of the difficulty of defining items eligible for 
lower or zero rates. A feasible alternative that was eventually adopted was to have 
only a limited number of basic food commodities at zero rate. This approach has had 
two advantages. First, it avoids many of the demarcation problems found in all tax 
systems characterized with generous concessions. And second, this approach 
alleviates the regressivity of the exemption. The benefit of a broad exemption for 
‘food’ would have been greater for higher-income groups than for the poor, as richer  
 
                                                 
3  The multiple of the income tax threshold to per capita income has been computed by taking the 
country’s annual tax relief and determining, on the basis of the lowest income tax rate, how much 
an individual would have to earn in order to reach a net income tax paying position. Currently, an 
individual earning Kshs 126,720 would be liable at 10 per cent to an income tax of Kshs 12,672. 
Given that the tax relief is Kshs 1,056 per month, then the tax threshold is approximately 
Kshs 126,720 (around US$1,690 at the average exchange rate for 2003), or four times the current 
per capita income of about US$404. 
4   One cannot ascertain the level of progressivity simply by looking at the statutory tax schedule. As 
explained in this paper, the income tax reforms in Kenya introduced reductions in the nominal 
marginal rates as well as reductions and rationalization to the tax brackets, but concurrently 
taxbases were expanded to bring untaxed income sources within the tax net.  
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people buy more expensive food and may actually spend a higher percentage of their 
income on nourishment. A concession for only a very limited number of defined 
foodstuffs may be of less benefit to high-income taxpayers as both the percentage of 
income budgeted for basic foodstuffs and the actual amount spent may decline as 
income rises. Although any specific proposal aimed at addressing the equity and pro-
poor question needs to be examined in the context of the entire tax system, reducing 
the number of individuals subjected to income taxation through measures supporting a 
high threshold for income tax and lower rates on certain basic foodstuffs should 
continue to merit serious consideration.  
 
Table 6 
Has Kenya’s income tax reforms been pro-poor? 
Multiple of tax threshold to per capita income 
Year  PIT threshold, USD  Per capita income, USD
Multiple of PIT threshold 
 to per capita income 
1995 707.4  308  2.3 
1996 956.2  303  3.2 
1997 1114.3  337  3.3 
1998 1192.1  363  3.3 
1999 1239.3  324  3.8 
2000 1259.8  311  4.0 
2001 1465.6  331  4.4 
2002 1612.2  360  4.5 
2003 1667.4  404  4.1 
Source: Authors’  computation. See footnote 3. 
5  Implementation of tax reforms in Kenya: summary of the problems 
and successes  
The process of tax reforms in Kenya, as can be discerned from the foregoing, was a 
gradual process rather than a ‘big  bang’ approach. The gradual approach was 
probably adopted because Kenya’s political and economic environment was not 
conducive to the big bang, as was the case in some of the transition economies in 
Eastern Europe or the emerging post-conflict countries in Africa. Nevertheless, next 
we briefly discuss the successes and failures in the implementation of tax reforms in 
Kenya. 
5.1  Government commitment to reforms 
The commitment of the Kenyan government to tax reforms can largely be described 
as having been positive. Since the start of reforms, economic policy statements such 
as those issued through the budget speeches to Parliament every year outlined the 
fiscal policy options actually being implemented. It can be stated that the objectives of 
the tax reform were clearly understood and were seen as a vital part of a wider 
economic strategy to make the country less vulnerable to the external and internal 
shocks that could easily lead to macroeconomic imbalances. 
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5.2  Political opposition/support to reforms 
Apart from the trade policy component, which advocated the rationalization and 
reduction of import tariffs as well as the liberalization of trade, there was very limited 
opposition to tax reforms in Kenya. One could even state that there was a broad 
consensus in the country on the necessity of reform. Even contentious taxes like VAT 
which had precipitated social unrest in some countries, encountered virtually no 
opposition. This may have been due to a disorganized consumers lobby constituency, 
but all in all tax policy measures received very little opposition, even at the political 
level. But as noted earlier, trade liberalization reforms were viewed with hostility by 
the domestic manufacturing subsector who felt threatened by the imports. At the 
political level, however, there was no organized opposition from the manufacturing 
sector. On the other hand, the trade policy supporting Kenya’s commitments to the 
COMESA and EAC Treaties has recently raised some concern both at industry and 
political levels, as these have greatly impacted on the agricultural sector. A good case 
in point is the question of opening up the sugar subsector to COMESA imports and 
the liberalization of the cereals subsector under the Free Trade Area arrangements that 
allow maize from Kenya’s neighbouring countries into the local market. In both 
instances, there has been strong political opposition that has caused the government to 
resort to the safeguard measures included in regional trading arrangements, such the 
COMESA Treaty. 
5.3 Institutional  constraints 
One issue not covered in this study is the question of tax administration reforms. 
Instead, our focus has been more on tax policy reforms. But then again, one could also 
argue that tax administration is the same as tax policy. One of the key aspects of tax 
reform was the establishment of the Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) as an 
independent tax administration organization with autonomy from the Treasury. The 
Ministry of Finance is responsible for setting tax policy while KRA ensures that 
policy with respect to revenue mobilization is implemented. KRA, established in 
1994, has been operational since 1995. In terms of addressing the institutional 
constraints in reforming taxation, one cannot overlook tax administration. KRA was 
meant to address the institutional constraints that were believed to hinder 
implementation of the tax reforms. But given the fact that KRA became operational in 
1995, the issue of sequencing should be raised because some reform measures such as 
VAT had already been initiated in the pre-KRA era. Hence, it may not be easy to 
conclude that there were institutional constraints which hindered the success of the tax 
reforms. Furthermore, revenue adequacy as measured by the tax revenue-to-GDP ratio 
has not been much of an issue. Therefore, in order to adequately examine the question 
of institutional constraints, one is forced to look beyond the issues of revenue 
adequacy and the tax structure. 
Research shows that compliance to VAT and income tax is 55 per cent and 30 per 
cent, respectively (see Karingi et al. 2005). This implies that it should be possible to 
reduce the current taxpayers’ burden by raising the compliance rate. In other words, it 
is possible to reduce the VAT rate from its current level of 16 per cent without any 
government revenue shortfall by increasing compliance. The same applies to CIT: 
even if the rate is reduced from 30 per cent to 25, a revenue-neutral position can be 
achieved by raising income taxation compliance. Taxpayers face significant  
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compliance costs and these interfere with their willingness to pay. Thus, it is evident 
that low compliance is mainly an administrative issue related to KRA, and their costly 
administrative structure itself contributes to the problem. For instance, a taxpayer in 
Kenya can be audited three times (for VAT, income tax, excise tax) but yet still  
be dealing with KRA only. Furthermore, if liable to a levy, the taxpayer may also be 
audited by government ministries. The tax-by-tax organization of KRA needs to   
be revisited. Best international practices suggest that revenue administration be 
organized according to function, so that audits are conducted as a single operation, 
and not by the type of tax. For example, one auditing section should undertake tax 
audit in a firm for CIT, VAT, excise tax and any other taxes collected by the 
government. 
There are other problems related to KRA performance, such as the failure to utilize 
the personal identification number (PIN) assigned to each taxpayer. It certainly does 
not help the taxpayer to have so many numbers and codes, even though taxes and 
other payments are made to the same government agency. This could be associated to 
the lack of computerization. Computerization would enable KRA to interact with 
taxpayers through an integrated computer interface, saving not only time but also 
increasing compliance, as the PIN facilitates follow-up. With computerization, it 
would also become easier to consolidate payment of all taxes and levies. 
6 Recommendations  for  Kenya 
6.1 Improving  tax  mobilization 
As indicated in the introduction of this paper, revenue adequacy is not an issue of 
concern in Kenya, as maintaining a 22 per cent revenue-to-GDP ratio is the official 
policy. Consequently, the key issues concerned with the improvement of tax 
mobilization are related more to administration than policy. The appropriate 
recommendations in this respect have already been identified by the government and 
are outlined in a study entitled Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and 
Employment Creation (GoK 1993). Essentially, the key recommendation is to address 
the need to reform tax administration by broadening the taxbase in order to reduce 
taxation, particularly of the businesses and individuals currently carrying the burden 
of achieving the 22 per cent of GDP target. Critical to the reform of tax administration 
will be the consolidation of government revenue collection through KRA; optimal 
utilization of the PIN; and computerization of the KRA systems. Such tax 
administration improvements will enable the government to reduce the rates of most 
of the taxes, with the result that their distortionary effect of taxes will be minimized. 
6.2  Distributional impacts of taxes 
So far, very little work has been undertaken on the distributional impact of taxes in 
Kenya. Even in this paper the evidence on the progressivity of the tax system is more 
anecdotal than empirical. Therefore, a more thorough incidence analysis of the 
different taxes would be useful. The main challenge to this objective is the limitations 
imposed by data availability. An incidence analysis of taxes requires disaggregated 
data, also at the household level, if possible. Well structured database of the labour  
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market is also essential. Without such data, it is difficult to conduct a reasonable study 
of the distributional impacts of taxes. Two methodologies—microsimulation 
modelling augmented with general equilibrium models—are amenable to 
distributional impacts analysis and are recommended by this study 
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